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Summary  findinigs
Well-designed bank safety nets should alter bank  of firms and banks. Government regulations or safety net
behavior and deepen financial intermediation by shifting  provisions should be designed to work in harmony with
some risk to the government. It is often said that the best  the incentives private agents already face.
safety net for a financial system is one that makes market  * Safety nets must take into account both aggregate
participants behave as if the safety net did not exist.  risk and idiosyncratic risk. In particular, good safety nets
Brock examines issues associated with safety nets for  must be designed to take into account large but
financial systems in small open economies such as those  infrequent  macroeconomic shocks as well as to
in Latin America.  encourage prudential bank behavior during normal
He stresses three principles that should guide the  times.
design and operations of a financial system safety net:  * Safety net design should be grounded in the historical
* Safety nets should strengthen rather than supplant  and institutional framework of any given country. Safety
private capital, monitoring, and closure mechanisms. The  nets evolve over time and must allow for problems that
presence of asymmetric information gives borrowers,  have existed for a long time - but must also take into
bankers, and depositors incentives to voluntarily impose  account current political pressures and today's generally
capital requirements, monitoring arrangements, and  higher expectations about the government's ability to
contractual provisions for the closure or recapitalization  insure the financial system against aggregate shocks.
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Financial safety nets are, in general terms, a set of institutions, laws, and procedures that
strengthen  the  ability  of  the  financial  system  to  withstand  bank  runs  and  other  systemic
disturbances.  Safety nets evolve over time so that in any one country the existing safety net has
been  shaped  by  that  country's  history  of  financial  crises  and  regulatory  pressures.  Some
innovations in financial safety nets, however, spread contemporaneously between countries.  A
recent example is the widespread adoption of deposit insurance by developing countries.
Safety nets shift  risk to the govermnent  at the  same time  that they promote financial
deepening.  In the same way that banks can bear the residual risk from many diversified projects
better than any single agent, the goverrunent by insuring a diversified set of banks can bear the
residual risk of bank failure better than any set of depositors at a single bank.  Although it is
frequently said that the best safety net is one that results in market participants behaving as if the
safety net did not exist, well-designed bank safety nets should alter bank behavior and deepen
financial intermediation by shifting some risk to the government.
A good institutional safety net will balance the benefits of financial deepening to society
with the costs of risk-shifting to the government.  The design of a good safety net must balance
its components--including lender-of-last-resort facilities, deposit insurance, capital requirements,
supervision,  and closure and recapitalization  rules--in such a x,ay  as to  carefully control  the
amount of risk borne by the government.  To the extent that a formal safety net fails to anticipate
political and economic pressures during a crisis, an ex-post safety net will emerge in which risk
shifting is driven by governmental discretion rather thai  oy rules.
Many  books have been written  in the  last decade  on financial  safety  nets,  including
Benston  and colleagues (1986), Brock  (1992), Dewatripont and  Tirole  (1993), Hausman  and
Rojas-Suarez  (1996),  Lindgren,  Garcia,  and  Saal  (1996),  and  Rojas-Suarez  (1997).  Some
textbooks, such as Garber and Weisbrod (1992), have also included expanded sections on safety
nets.  Papers by Calomiris (1996), Mishkin (1996), and Garber (1997) are particularly valuable2
recent contributions to the growing safety net literature for developing countries.  The literature
on safety nets has become technically more precise by drawing on advances in contract theory
and optimal governance structure.  Dewatripont and Tirole (1993) is an example of the good
application of newer theory to the design of financial safety nets.  In this paper I begin with a
treatment of some aspects of the theory, but leave more extensive coverage to the papers cited
above.  My approach draws more on institutional economics, and more precisely on the approach
taken by Kindleberger (1978), in the sense that I believe the design of good financial safety nets
for Latin America depends upon an understanding of the way that formal ex-ante safety nets have
broken down during times of crisis over the past one  hundred years.  Such an understanding
requires historical examples, and leads to the conclusion that applications of contract theory and
optimal governance structure have not yet solved the technical problem of designing an optimal
safety net for economies that are subject to large aggregate shocks.
In this paper I explore these issues surrounding safety nets for financial systems in small
open economies like those in Latin  America.  The starting point in Section 2 is the idea that
asymmetric information will generally restrict the scope for lending to potential borrowers.  In
the presence of asymmetric information the creation of loan covenants will generally benefit both
borrowers and lenders by reducing the cost of lending.  These loan covenants usually involve
capital ratios, provisions for monitoring, and mechanisms for shifting control of assets to lenders
when borrowers cannot repay.
Section 3 shows that government regulation of financial  intermediaries can frequently
lower the cost of lending.  The creation of better bankruptcy laws, the granting of special legal
powers to bank boarcls, and the requirement that liquid bank liabilities be backed up by liquid
assets are all ways in which prudential state regulation can expand the scope for intermediation.
Although prudential regulation may sometimes not imply the creation of an explicit safety net,
the  section  shows  that  state  regulation  of  the  financial  system  frequently  results  in  state
intervention during times of crisis, even when there is no formal role for the government.  The
diversion of government funds to borrowers or the devaluation of the exchange rate are common3
ways to provide an ex-post  safety net to banks and borrowers (but not generally to depositors).
Section 4 discusses the creation of central banks in Latin America in the  1920s as an
innovation to promote  financial deepening.  In additiop to  the basic goals  of prudential state
regulation, a central bank has the goal of expanding intermediation by more formally monitoring
bank operations  and  by acting  as  lender of last resort  to  assure the  liquidity of the banking
system.  The  section  examines  in  particular  why  orthodox  institutions  adhering  to  the  gold
standard were forced to extend an ad hoc safety net to rescue banks and bank borrowers at the
start of the Great Depression.  The section then examines the operation of the safety net under
financial repression and during financial liberalizations.  Ex-ante safety nets have almost never
been in  place  during  financial  liberalizations,  but  ex-post  safety nets  always  emerge  during
financial crises that frequently  follow the liberalizations.  These ex-post  safety nets are often
complex and take many years to unravel once they have been put into place.
Depositors are typically left out of the informal safety net.  During crises depositors may
suffer explicit losses ("haircuts").  More likely is the imposition of capital controls and exchange
rate devaluation that lowers the foreign exchange value of deposits.  Section 5 shows that the
extension of the safety net to depositors is a relatively new and untested development.  Like other
state interventions, deposit insurance has the goal of expanding the scope of intermediation by
lowering the cost of funds to banks.  If the state has  a comparative advantage in monitoring
banks, deposit insurance has the potential to improve welfare and expand output.  As with other
innovations that expand the scope for intermediation, the safety net created by deposit insurance
may seriously misallocate an economy's resources.  The section then poses the issues raised by
deposit insurance within the  framework of  catastrophe insurance.  For most  Latin  American
countries the long-term challenge to the credibility of deposit insurance will be the ability of their
governments to  secure a  large  enough access to  world  capital markets  to  protect  depositors
following "catastrophic" macroeconomic shocks.
Section 6 concludes with a discussion of the design of safety nets that takes into account
the principles developed in the paper.4
2.  Capital, Monitoring, and Closure
The discussion of safety nets can usefully be centered around the concepts of asymmetric
information, adverse selection and moral hazard.  The problem for a bank and its borrowers is the
presence of asymmetric information regarding the ex ante profitability of projects.  If the bank
cannot distinguish between projects it must charge a "lemons" premium across all projects that
takes into account the probability of mistakenly funding a bad project.1 As a result, borrowers
with good projects have an  incentive to  look elsewhere for funding, leaving  the bank with a
worse pool of borrowers from which  to  choose.  If this  adverse selection problem  is severe
enough,  no  lending  takes  place. 2 Even  if  the  adverse  selection  problem  is  not  severe,
asymmetric information creates a moral hazard  that gives borrowers an incentive to add risk or
take other actions that increase the probability of default after the loan has been made.  These
same forces are at work between depositors and banks, creating problems of adverse selection
("bad" banks are more apt to enter a market) and moral hazard (banks have an incentive to add
risk or take other actions that harm depositors).
An institutional safety net shifts responsibility to the governrnent for managing some of
the incentive problems arising from asymmetric information.  Deposit  insurance, for example,
relieves depositors of the need to worry about banks' incentives to add risk in the presence of
asymmetric  information by  giving that  responsibility  to the  deposit  insurance  agency.  The
effectiveness of the institutional safety net depends  on its ability to promote  adequate capital
adequacy levels in banks and firms, to create effective monitoring and supervision mechanisms,
and to impose appropriate punishments (such as bank closure or removal of bank management)
when the resources of the safety net are called upon.
Although  safety  net  issues especially  involve  deposit  contracts,  the  analysis  of  loan
contracts provides a simpler starting point.  When banks lend money to firms, they write loan
I  See  Akerlof  (1970)
2See Stiglitz  and Weiss  (1981)5
contracts.  Loan contracts are a form of put option, in which the firm pays if it can and defaults if
it cannot pay.  The bank collects an "insurance" premium  if the firm can repay, and otherwise
collects the collateral on the loan or the residual value of the firm.
The  problem  for  the  firm  and  the  bank  is  the  presence  of  asymmetric  information
regarding the ex ante profitability of the project.  Both adverse selection and moral hazard hurt
the firm by limiting the willingness of banks to lend and by raising the cost of loans that are
made.  The bank is hurt by a loss of profits from a limited use of fixed factors of production.
Both the firm and the bank have an incentive to incorporate elements into a loan contract the
reduce the effects of asymmetric information.  One standard element of a contract is a restriction
on the amount of debt that a firm can have, and a requirement that loans from other lenders be
reported to the bank.  These restrictions are a forn  of capital requirement, since they  limit the
leverage  of the  firm.  Another  element  is the  requirement  that  the  firm  be  audited  by  an
independent auditor,  or that  the  bank have  a representative  on the  firm's  board of  directors.
Finally, many loan contracts are short term but rolled over so that the bank can force the firm to
default  if it becomes clear that the firm will not be able to pay back the loan.  This provision
limits the bank's losses from actions the firm could take to run down the value of its assets once
it ceases to be a viable enterprise.
In summary, when a bank lends to a firm the loan contract is a form of insurance contract
(a put option on the firm's assets).  There are two common ways in which a firm can hurt the
bank:  misrepresentation of its assets (leading to a problem of adverse selection) and misuse of
those  assets  once the loan  is approved  (moral hazard).  In order  to  lower contracting  costs
associated with  asymmetric information, both banks and  firmns  find it advantageous to include
capital requirements, monitoring provisions, and closure mechanisms.  These measures lower the
cost of intermediation by allowing the bank to sort out good borrowers from bad borrowers, and
by influencing the incentives of good borrowers once loans have been made.  Successful use of
these measures results in financial  deepening:  more projects are undertaken, and their adoption
does not depend on self-financing.  At the same time, bank financing of these projects results in6
financial risk  shifting:  limited  liability  firms  bear  only part  of  the  downside  risk  for their
projects,  with banks assuming  the remainder of the risk.  The loan rate reflects, in part, the
compensation the bank must receive for bearing the residual risk.
Deposit Contracts
Deposits are formally equivalent to a put option on a bank's assets.  Deposits must pay a
return that  includes an implicit  premium to  cover possibility of default  (the premium on the
implicit put  option).  Asymmetric  information between depositors and  the bank's  owners and
managers once again causes problems due to adverse selection and moral hazard.  If depositors
cannot distinguish between good and  bad bankers, the adverse selection problem will create a
lemons premium that  penalizes good  banks and makes bad  bankers  more likely to  enter the
business.  Once depositors give their money to a given bank at fixed terms, the bank has an
incentive to undertake actions that help bank owners at the expense of depositors.  This moral
hazard can result in bank  managers adding risk to the  bank's loan portfolio, misrepresenting
earnings  and  paying  out  increased  dividends  to  shareholders,  and  other  actions  that  hurt
depositors.
Unregulated banks have an incentive to create mechanisms that mitigate the effects of
asymmetric  information.  Without  such  mechanisms  the  lemons  problem  may  create  an
equilibrium in which there are no deposits.  Even if there are some depositors willing to lend
their funds to the bank, the deposits  may come at a high cost, thereby limiting the scope for
intermediation.  Asymmetric  information  poses  greater  difficulties  at  the  level  of  deposit
contracts than loan contracts, because the free riding problem is greater at the deposit level than
at the loan level.  At the loan level, the benefits of the bank's information-gathering expenditure
on a borrower accrue primarily to the bank.  At the deposit level, expenditure on monitoring by
one depositor is more readily useable by other depositors of the same bank, so that no depositor
has an incentive to enforce deposit covenants that mimic loan covenants imposed by a bank.  To7
partially solve this problem, a bank may be willing to submit to an external audit in order to
create publicly available information about assets, reserves, loans to bank directors, and other
data that signal the quality of the bank.  Banks may also issue demandable debt,  such as bank
notes  or demand  deposits,  rather than time  deposits.  As  Calomiris and  Kahn  (1991) show,
demandable  debt creates  a sequential service constraint  (first-come, first-serve) that makes it
worthwhile for some depositors to invest resouces in monitoring the bank.  Demandable debt
reduces the problem of free riding, since depositors that rely on others to monitor are less apt to
recover their funds if there is a run on the bank.
Unregulated  banks  must  generally offer  demandable  debt in  order  to  induce  enough
expenditure on  monitoring  by  depositors to  lower the  lemons premium.  Runs on  the bank
become the mechanism for detailed monitoring of the bank, since a run causes the bank to stop
operations and open its books to depositors.  If the bank is not solvent, the bank run forces the
bank's closure and exit from the industry.
3.  Prudential Regulation without a Safety Net
Banks have more often been subject to a "light" amount of prudential regulation rather
than no regulation prior to the development of a bank safety net.  The key similarity between no
regulation and light regulation is that the closure mechanism is generally triggered by bank runs,
and the government remains outside of the compensation process for bank creditors.  The key
difference is that the government creates laws and norms that comrnit banks to more stringent
prudential practices than banks could guarantee depositors without such regulation.
The key features of "light" regulation can be seen by examining free banking legislation
in the United States in the nineteenth century.  Following the 1838 New York State Free Bank
Law, free bank legislation in most states created a formn  of "narrow banking."  States would give
bank notes to free banks in exchange for U.S. governnent  bonds or approved state bonds.  Free
banks would then circulate the bank notes and, equally importantly, take deposits to make loans.8
Free  banks  were  subject to  minimum capital  requirements  and  sometimes  "double  liability"
requirements (where shareholders were personally responsible for an additional amount up to the
par value of bank capital in case of the bank's liquidation).  The comptroller of a state could,
upon petition by depositors,  order the detailed inspection  of a free bank and have the results
published.
Between  1838 and  1863 many free banks failed in U.S.  Only a small portion of note
holders  lost  money,  but  deposit  holders  lost  much  more.  Despite  each  state's  role  in  the
regulation  of  free  banks,  state  governments  avoided  becoming  insurers  of  bank  notes  or
deposits. 3
Pressures for Bank Safety Nets Before Central Banks
Free banking and other formns  of narrow banking worked successfully in the nineteenth
century United States in the sense that they protected the means of payment (bank notes) and did
not result in government bank rescues in crisis times.  Despite the fact that depositors did lose
deposits during crisis times and banks failed, there appears to have been no effective pressure for
a safety net to be provided by the governnent.  Part of the lack of government response was tied
to successive U.S. governments' commitment to the gold standard.  Part of the lack of response
may  also  have  been  associated  with  the  decentralized  federal  forn  of  government.  These
characteristics are unusual from the perspective of the small open economies of Latin America.
An historical example from the nineteenth century will help illustrate how the borrowers of a
financial  institution  with  no  explicit  safety  net  could  generate  enough  pressure  on  the
goverrnent  to create an ex-post safety net.
The earliest documented ex post governnental  safety net in Latin America was created in
Chile about 140 years ago.  During the early 1850s foreign gold rushes had created pressures to
3New  York's  1838  Free  Bank Law, for example,  states "...nothing  in this act contained  shall  be considered  as
implying  any pledge  on the part of the state for the payment  of said bills or notes beyond  the proper  application  of
the securities  pledged  to :he  comptroller  for  their redemption."  See Brock  (1  992a,  p. 431)9
increase grain exports from the Central Valley of Chile to California and Australia.  But the large
Chilean landowners wishing to expand their production had no access to long-term credit since
existing mortgage laws were poorly defined in legal terms.  In addition, potential lenders were
faced  with  the  lack  of  reliable  information  on  the  holdings,  quality,  and  legal  status  of
landholdings.  Asymmetric  information and potential  adverse selection,  coupled with  lack of
legal mechanisms to enforce contracts resulted in a lemons problem where no long-term lending
took place.
The Chilean Congress responded in 1856 by creating a "special" mortgage that gave clear
rights to the lender.  Property registries were set up to make information on mortgages, sales, and
censuses readily available to the public.  In addition the Congress also created a state-sponsored
mortgage bank, the Caja de Credito Hipotecario, to accompany the new mortgage law.4 The
property  registries  helped  to  mitigate  the  asymmetric  information  problem  facing  lenders.
Equally importantly, the Caja became a delegated monitor that could reduce the costs of lending
by adhering to legally-mandated collateral requirements, holding a diversified portfolio of loans,
and by economies of scale in monitoring.  The new mortgage law gave clear authority to the Caja
to enforce bankruptcy proceedings (i.e., a closure rule) if a landholder fell sufficiently behind in
making mortgage payments.
The reform of mortgage laws and the creation of the Caja solved the lemons problem,
thereby pernitting  some risk shifting from landowners to the Caja and to purchasers of the Caja's
securities.  The accompanying financial  deepening propelled  the expansion of  irrigation and
other land improvements by landholders.  By the end of 1860 there were over 5 million pesos of
the Caja's securities in circulation (equal in value to ten percent of exports).
Although the rapid five-year credit expansion permitted landowners to undertake capital
improvements to their land, it also exposed them to macroeconomic shocks.  Many landowners
4The Caja was authorized  to lend up to fifty percent  of the assessed  value of the real  estate  and was given legal
precedence  in  the collection  of its loans. In exchange  for the mortgages  the Caja issued  letras  de credito  with
maturities  of 21-25  years and coupon  rates of 5-8 percent. Borrowers  could then sell the letras  on a secondary
market  for  cash. When  landholders  went  to sell  the letras  on the  secondary  market,  they  received  a higher  price
because  purchasers  demanded  a smaller insurance  premium  knowing  that the Caja,  via its capital  and reserves,  was
the primary  insurer  of the mortgages.10
became unable to make their mortgage payments at the end of the 1850s when the Californian
and  Australian  export  markets  collapsed.  Responding  to  intense  pressure  to  prevent  the
foreclosure  of  landholdings,  the  government  in  1858  and  1859 clandestinely  channeled  to
landholders about 2 million pesos of a 7 million peso railroad loan that had been financed in the
London  bond  market  by  the  government.  This  government  action  caused  risk-shifting  to
taxpayers that was not envisioned by the Caja Hipotecaria's institutional structure.  Pressures by
foreign investors in the railroad loan as well as the installation of a new government led to an
attempt to recover the clandestine loans in  1860.  The resulting economic contraction of  1861
and  1862, which produced the liquidation of a large number of landholdings, was Chile's first
financial crisis and one of its most severe economic contractions of the nineteenth century. 5
The example highlights  features common to  the dynamics  of many  implicit financial
safety nets.  The Caja Hipotecaria and the accompanying legal reforms were created to promote
financial deepening.  Prudential lending practices were legally mandated, so that risk-shifting to
the Caja was carefully controlled in theory.  In practice, the Caja expanded its mortgage lending
so quickly that it became overly-exposed to the risk of a mass default by landowners in response
to an external shock.  The threat of massive bankruptcies initially created pressure for an ex-post
safety net financed by the government and then contributed to a severe economic downturn as
liquidation of properties finally took place.
5See Brock (1992b), Fetter  (1931).11
4.  Central Banks
The introduction of Central Banks into Latin America in the 1920s and  1930s had far-
reaching  consequences  for  financial  deepening  and  for  incentives  to  shift  risk  onto  the
governments.  The Central Bank of Chile, like several others, was the outcome of a mission led
by Edwin Kemmerer, which was invited to establish a set of institutions that would allow Chile
to return to the gold standard and eliminate the inflation that began in  1878.  The Kemmerer
Commission  made recommendations  for a central bank  and  a  superintendency of banks that
would jointly watch over the financial system.
The  institutions  and  laws  created by  the  Kemmerer  commissions  had  the  following
characteristics.  First, they attempted to modernize banking rules and make them uniform.  Bank
laws were passed that established minimum capital/asset ratios and minimum ratios of reserves
to liabilities.  Superintendencies of banks were created to examine the banks and to enforce the
rules  contained in  the  banking  legislation  or the  norms  issued  by  the  central  banks.  The
superintendencies were located outside the central banks as part of the finance ministries.  The
central banks were semi-public institutions that were guaranteed independence from the finance
ministries and the rest of the government.  Gold and foreign exchange reserves were typically
required to cover at least fifty percent of the central bank's demandable liabilities.
The key policy tool of the central banks was the rediscount window, which was the only
mechanism available for regulating the money supply.  The new central banks were authorized to
extend  their  credit  against  the  collateral  of  short-term  commercial  paper.6 Central  banks
established one set of discount rates for dealing with  banks and another slightly higher set of
discount rates for dealing with the public.  The rates favoring the banks were intended to foster
the role of  the central bank  as the lender of  last resort.  The slightly higher,  but moderate,
discount rates to the public were designed to put pressure on banks to lower their loan rates and
make them more uniform.
6Tamagna  (1965),  p. 10812
The new legislation and institutions did not create an explicit safety net for banks.  It did
set  up  capital  requirements,  provisions  for  monitoring,  and  authority  to  close  banks.  For
example,  Chile closed the second  largest  bank  in the  first year of  the operation  of the new
institutions.  The Central  Banks  also  had  additional  power  to  reduce moral  hazard by  their
control over discount rates to banks and the public.  These measures reduced the cost of financial
internediation  and  permitted financial  deepening  to  take  place.  This  deepening  was  not
automatic,  however.  The  public  relied  heavily  on  the  Banco  de  Mexico  as  a  depository
institution, for example, as a result of continued distrust of commercial banks.
Against these achievements, the legislation in  these countries created a  guarantee that
domestic currency would be convertible into foreign exchange at a fixed exchange rate.  This, in
combination with the newly-instituted oversight of the banking system, created strong pressures
for capital inflows.  In essence, the fixed exchange rate with fiscal oversight of banks created an
implicit guarantee on banks'  foreign exchange liabilities, thereby allowing risk-shifting to take
place along with,financial deepening.
Safety nets emerged in Latin America, just as in the United States, as an ad-hoc response
to the Great Depression.  It is worth recounting the steps leading to the creation of the safety net
in Chile because they contain elements that have become standard in more recent financial crises
in the region.  In terms of measures that ensure financial stability, the Chilean system in the late
1920s operated with capital/asset ratios of 20 to 30 percent, monitoring by the Superintendencia
de Bancos was rigorous, and closure was enforced.  By normal standards the financial apparatus
erected in 1926 was sufficient to render moral hazard and adverse selection unimportant.  And by
normal standards there was no need for a safety net for the banks.  Indeed, the whole apparatus
lowered the cost  of  financial intermediation,  so that  depositors  required  a  smaller premium,
borrowers paid lower  loan rates, and  foreigners had  the assurance that their  loans would  be
repaid in foreign currency.  All of these effects  enhanced financial deepening between 1925 and
1929.  The main theme of the boxed discussion of Chile's ex post  safety net is that orthodox13
governnents  frequently respond to a financial crisis by initially affirmning  that there is no safety
net, followed later by a series of emergency rescue measures that create an ex-post safety net.
Did the new  institutions  and legislation lower  the cost of financial intermediation too
much?  Too much here refers in a narrow sense to the ability of the government to make good on
its fixed exchange rate guarantee.  In a broader sense it refers to the ability of the government to
insure against large macroeconomic shocks.  In much of Latin America  the answer  was that
governments could not guarantee the functioning of the banking system under the rules of the
gold standard.  The ad hoc bank safety nets created at the start of the Great Depression saved the
banks  at the  cost  of  capital  levies  on depositors,  moratoriums  on  foreign debt  service, and
emergency loans from the central banks.14
Safety Nets Under Financial Repression
The Chilean  Safety  Net for the Great  Depression
Following  the creation  of the Chilean  Central Bank and accompanying  banking  legislation,  the Chilean
economy  grew at an average  rate of about ten percent per year during the four years from 1926  through
1929. With the start of the Great Depression,  Chile's GDP fell by 11 percent in 1930, 17 percent in
1931,  and 27 percent in 1932  for a cumulative  decline  of over 50 percent in three years.
As the economy went into the Depression,  the Superintendency  of Banks and the Central Bank raised
deposit rates in several incremental  steps up to the third quarter of 1931. The Superintendency  also
took strong steps to  force banks to adjust to  the deterioration of the quality of their loans and
investments. Included in its measures  were stepped up inspections  of the loan portfolio of banks, the
pricing  to market of bonds and real estate investments,  the enforcement  of provisioning  against possible
loan losses,  and the setting  of penalty interest rates  on nonperforming  loans.
The immediate  impact  of the economy's  deterioration  and Superintendency's  increased  supervision  was
a rise in past-due loans. Nonperforming  loans as a percentage  of total bank assets rose from 4.3 percent
in 1929 to 15.3 percent by the end of 1931. As a result of the economic  and financial deterioration,
four out of twenty-two  banks were forced  to close in 1930  and 1931.
The economy's  adjustment  through mid-1931  took place according to the rules of the gold standard.
Even  though the Central Bank lost over half its gold holdings between  January 1930  and July 1931, it
still had a reserve of 72 percent against its demandable  liabilities  (notes and deposits). The political
adjustment  of the country  to the onset of the Depression  included decree laws restricting freedom of
expression, supression of  the press,  and  the  imprisoning or  deportation of  opponents of  the
government.
During  the period frorn July 1931  to the beginning  of June 1932  economic  policy began to move away
from orthodoxy.  Exchange controls were announced  on July 30th with the objective of protecting
Chile's  remaining  gold reserves,  following  an earlier  default on Chile's  foreign  debt.
Amid growing  civil unrest to the still largely  orthodox  adjustment  measures,  a military coup overthrew
the government in mid-1932 and, after a  few weeks, set up the 100-day Socialist Republic.  The
govemment passed  legislation that gave the  president vast  powers to  intervene in enterprises,
introduced trade quotas and  import licenses, and  created jobs  for  unemployed workers.  The
government  also devalued  the exchange  rate by 70 percent and declared  a three-day  bank holiday  (June
6-8, 1932), during which bank deposits were frozen and foreign funds in the banking system were
declared  property  of the State. In an effort  to bail out private debtors,  the Socialist  Republic  established
a moratorium  on the repayment  of debts.
Over  the course of 1932  successive  govemments  increased  domestic  credit by about 800 million  pesos,
a figure equal to about 70 percent of the banking system's  total loan portfolio.  During 1933  and 1934
the Chilean  economy recovered  very quickly,  with real GDP rising by 16 percent in the first year. The
recovery  was partly due to the sharp improvement  in the external conditions facing Chile and to the
restoration of political stability.  In addition, a  ten-year tax holiday for all new commercial and
residential  construction  begun before the end of 1935 created a construction  boom that succeeded  in
raising  depressed  property  values. Debt relief was provided  by the  30 percent price level increase  that
took place between June 1932 and June 1933 while interest rates were controlled  at low rates and
penalty interest rates were rescinded.  The real value of debts was substantially  reduced and non-
performing  loans  declined  rapidly  in 1933  and 1934.15
With  the  closing of  Latin  American  economies  during  the  1930s and the  advent  of
import-substituting  industrialization,  many  financial  systems  became  largely  instruments  of
government  economic  policy.  Banks  were  subject  to  high  non-interest-bearing  reserve
requirements,  were  forced  to  buy  government  debt  as  part  of  their  secondary  reserve
requirements, and were directed to lend substantial portions of their portfolio to  sectors of the
economy favored by the government.  Deposits frequently paid rates of return that were negative
in real terms.
Under financial repression, banks rarely failed.  Asymmetric information became less of a
problem for banks and bank supervisors because much of bank portfolios was held as central
bank  reserves,  treasury  bonds,  and  low-risk directed  credit  to  import-substituting  industries.
Bank capital was allowed to erode.  For example, in Chile bank capital and reserves as a fraction
of assets fell from 27 percent in  1932 to 20 percent in  1940, 14 percent in  1948, 9 percent in
1955, and 6 percent in 1962 (Behrens).  Government institutional capital in monitoring eroded.
But the stability of the financial systems carne at  a price:  during the period from the  1930s to
the  1970s financial  shallowing  took place  in many countries.  The safety net for banks that
consisted of imposing low-yielding loan and investments  and  paying negative real returns to
depositors caused the financial system to atrophy.  Sporadic attempts to liberalize usually met
with crisis, as in Chile during 1959-62 and Colombia  during 1962-66.
Financial Liberalization
Attempts at financial liberalization in Latin America beginning in the Southern Cone in
the 1970s and spreading through much of the rest of the region during the 1980s and 1  990s have
not been painless.  In most countries financial regulatory structures had not changed appreciably
since the 1940s. But information problems during liberalizations became more severe than in the
preceding forty years as banks' porfolios switched from low-risk, low-yield government paper
and directed loans to much higher yield and higher risk loans to companies, construction, and16
consumers.  Monitoring of borrowers by banks was difficult, and there was much incompetence
among bankers regarding both initial and ongoing  loan evaluations.  There was equally great
incompetence  by  bank  examiners  in  their  examinations  of  banks.  Many  of  the  best  bank
examiners were hired away at high salaries by banks, and the remaining examiners were too few
and too powerless to engage in prudential supervision.  During the liberalizations bank capital
was inadequate, and even published capital/asset ratios were frequently overstated by concealing
(not reporting) bad loans and by double gearing within an economi6 group.7
One would expect that the cost of financial intermediation (the spread between the loan
rate and the deposit rate) would be higher with the lack of bank capital and the greater problems
associated  with  asymmetric  information.  And  that  has  generally  been  the  case.  But  the
difference between a  Chile  of the  1920s and  a  Chile  of the  1970s, for example,  is that the
government of the  1  970s  felt that it could not afford to follow orthodox banking rules for fear
that the entire economic liberalization would be derailed.  The rescue of Banco Osorno in early
1977 saved foreign creditors from losses that would have put an end to capital inflows that were
helping to fuiel the economic recovery.  The implicit government guarantees meant that  bank
spreads were much lower than they would have been otherwise after  1977.  The lower bank
spreads encouraged  financial  deepening.  The ratio of private sector domestic credit to GDP rose
from 8.8 percent in 1977 to 39.3 percent in 1981 (Brock 1996).  But the implicit guarantees--in
the context of severe problems of asymmetric information, poor monitoring capacity, and low
bank capital--also caused excessive risk-shifting  to the government.
So  although  the  Chilean  financial  liberalization  and  many  other  Latin  American
liberalizations appeared orthodox on the surface, the apparent initial success of the liberalizations
was held together by the strength of an implicit government guarantee to depositors and other
bank creditors.  This was the case in  Argentina, Uruguay, and  Chile at the beginning of the
1980s,  Colombia in 1]985,  Venezuela in 1994, and Mexico in 1995.  In each case the true bank
safety net was only unveiled as the financial crisis began.
7Double  gearing  refers  to a situation  where  a bank  will  lend,  say, $100  to a firm  within  its group  so  that  the  firm  can
buy  $1  00  of the  bank's  stock.  The  bank's  reported  capital  rises  by  $100,  but the  group's  capital  remains  the same.17
Since ex-post safety nets virtually always save banks even when there  are no ex-ante
safety nets, design of financial structures should take into account past experience with these ex-
post safety nets.  The accompanying box provides details on the Chilean safety net that was put
into  place  following  the  June  1982  devaluation  of  the  peso.  The  Chilean  experience  is
instructive, not only because it illustrates the potential dynamics and scope of an ex-post safety
net, but also because Mexico's measures to create a safety net in  1995 were patterned to some
extent after the Chilean measures.  The Chilean saga demonstrates that once the financial safety
net has been thrown out to save the banks, untangling it may be complex and time consuming.18
The Chilean Safety  Net for the 1980s
Following  Chile's June 1982  devaluation,  the first major step to stabilize the financial  system was the
creation  of a preferential  dollar exchange  rate for dollar debtors.  This step was taken because  of the
government's  previous  implicit guarantee  that the fixed exchange  rate would be a permanent  anchor for
the economy.  The preferential exchange rate provided a subsidy to dollar debtors that amounted
cumulatively  to about US$3.4  billion by the end of 1987.
In July 1982 the central bank began to buy part of banks' bad loan portfolios at face value.  As a
counterpart  to this transaction  the banks would  agree to buy back the portfolios  over a period  of three to
five years. This action improved  the balance  sheets of banks by replacing  nonperforming  assets with a
central bank bond, but because  the central  bank bond was not interest  bearing and was not transferable,
there was no transfer  of resources to the banks. There was, of course,  a contingent  transfer created  for
those banks  that would not be able to repurchase  their nonperforming  loans within  the three to five year
period.
Regulatory  forbearance  also played a role in the safety net. In September  1982  the Superintendency  of
Banks allowed banks to use the June 30 exchange  rate when calculating  the peso value of their dollar
liabilities. This represented  a 35 percent underestimation  of the value of dollar liabilities  by the end of
1982,  but prevented  a number of banks from violating  minimum  regulatory  capital ratios. Banks were
originally  to provision against these losses  by the end of 1982,  but were later given an extension until
the end of 1986. In addition, in October  the superintendency  extended  the time limit to declare a loan
non-performing  from 30 to 90 days.
The intervention  in the flagship  banks  of the two largest economic  conglomerates on January 13, 1983
also stabilized  the financial system by terminating  the creation of shell companies  and other measures
that were used to evade prudential  regulations. This step brought more than 50 percent of financial
system  assets and liabilities  under the direct control of the government  with explicit state backing  of the
liabilities  of the remaining  institutions. The step also gave the government  control of a number of the
largest  firms in the economy.
A major  departure  from previous  policy--that  all bank debt, both external  and domestic,  was private and
not government-guaranteed--came  shortly after the bank interventions. Although  the new law created  a
huge contingent  liability for the government,  it prevented a run on the banks and converted  the banks'
external debt into sovereign debt that would prevent the forced liquidation of  banks by foreign
creditors.
By early 1983 it had become clear that many debtors would not be able to repay their loans at the
contracted  terms.  In response to the growing threat of a widespread  debtor revolt, the government
announced  a "productive  debtor"  restructuring  plan in April 1983. The plan rescheduled  30 percent of
an eligible company's  debts for a period of 11 years, with a one-year grace period for interest and a
five-year  grace period for principal. The operation  created a flow subsidy  to the banks of 7 percent of
the amount of the restructured loans.  This flow subsidy was the carrot to encourage the banks to
restructure  their loans. Despite  this carrot, only 48,200 debtors out of 130,150  eligible participated  in
the program,  with about 39 percent of the eligible  debt reprogrammed.
The last major stabilization  measure,  announce in June 1983, involved  the creation  of a program for
home  mortgages  that rescheduled  unpaid  installments  since 1981.
By one year after the June 1982  devaluation,  all the safety net measures  were in place for the financial
system.  Three of the lprograms  were substantially  modified during the second year following the
devaluation. The repurchase  of banks' bad debt was expanded in February 1984,  the productive  debtor
plan was extended  in June 1984,  and the home mortgage  refinancing  plan was augmented  in July 1984.
However,  none of these measures resulted in any restructuring  of the financial system.  The largest
banks and the largest  enterprises  were still in limbo, under temporary government  control but without
any plan to restore  private ownership.19
When Hernan Bucchi took over as finance minister in  1985 he pressed the argument with foreign
creditors that the Chilean government had provided assistance of US$3.4 billion to help borrowers
repay their dollar loans,  and that now it was time for the creditor banks  to bear their share of the losses.
The creditor banks were pressing Chile to renew its guarantee on the Chilean banks' debt, especially
since much of the debt was maturing during 1985-87. Out of this negotiation  came Chile's renewal  of
its guarantee  on bank debt, combined with tacit creditor approval for the creation  of debt buyback  and
debt-equity  conversion  mechanisms. Between mid-1985  and mid-1987  about US$3.2 billion of bank
debt was written down or converted into equity by these mechanisms  at market discounts of about 30
percent. These  transactions  were an important  element in the recapitalization  of Chilean  banks.
Between 1982 and 1984 seventeen private national banks had sold bad loans to the Central Bank in
exchange for Central Bank bonds. In January 1985 a law creating "popular  capitalism"  authorized  the
Central Bank to capitalize a portion of the Central Bank's loans to the five intervened  banks. The law
resulted in the recapitalization  of four of the five intervened  banks.  Existing stockholders  had first
claim on stock purchases,  followed  by third parties. The remainder  of the stock was given to CORFO
(the Chilean Development  Corporation),  which purchased  an equivalent  nominal  amount of the Central
Bank's  emergency  credits  to the intervened  banks  (so that the emergency  credits  were capitalized). The
capital  was then sold in small amounts  to individual  investors.
In 1989 due to concem regarding the possible fiscal manipulation of banks' ability to repay, the
outgoing military government redrafted the agreements  between the banks and the Central Bank.  In
place of a fixed obligation,  the new law created "subordinated  debt"  that was equal in nominal value to
the fixed obligation,  but which had no fixed  timetable  of payments. The new contracts  with the Central
Bank were guaranteed  protection by the law against unilateral changes  by the Central Bank.  For the
five heavily indebted  banks there was effectively  no date at which the subordinated  debt would  ever be
repaid.
When  the newly-elected  democratic  government  took power in 1990,  one of the pressing  questions  was
an acceptable  resolution  of the subordinated  debt issue.. The total value of the subordinated  debt of
eleven banks in 1991 reached about US$3.3 billion while the value of paid-in capital was only $1.3
billion.  Despite  renewed efforts in 1992 and 1993,  the government  made no appreciable  progress in
drafting a law that would replace the subordinated  debt law and which would be acceptable  to the
banks.
After a  series of disputes, the government entered into talks with the banks which produced an
agreement in April 1995 to resolve the subordinated  debt problem by the end of July  1996.  The
solution  created  mechanisms  for the banks  to repay  part of their debt in exchange  for forgiveness  of the
remainder. During  the intense  period of negotiations  in June 1996,  the Central Bank president  became
convinced  that the banks were being let off too easy and resigned. In the end the Central Bank wrote
off approximately  $2 billion in order to recapitalize  the banks.
5.  Deposit Insurance and Aggregate Risk
Any financial system will have an implicit as well as explicit safety net.  Until the last
decade depositors have not  generally been included in  explicit safety nets in  Latin  America.
Indeed, depositors  have generally become  part of the ex  post safety nets to  save banks.  In
Argentina and Brazil in the  1  980s deposits were frozen and then reduced in real value by high20
inflation as a way of irnproving bank solvency. Even in Chile where deposits were guaranteed in
January  1983, interest rates on deposits were kept artificially low by a combination of capital
controls and Central Bank "suggestions" regarding the appropriate rates to pay.
Since 1981 the number of countries with explicit deposit insurance programs has risen
from  fifteen to  forty-five.  These programs  represent a  significant, but  untested, institutional
innovation in the adopting countries.  Creating an ex-ante safety net for depositors will lower the
cost  of  deposits  to  banks  by  moving  contracting  problems  associated  with  asymmetric
information to the government insuring agency.  As with other contractual innovations, deposit
insurance will lead to both.financial deepening and financial risk-shifting.  In this way it is no
different than loan contracts that banks negotiate with their  borrowers.  For loan contracts to
rernain viable  in the long run, banks  must have ways of imposing covenants  that restrict the
ability of borrowers to shift risk to the banks.  Likewise, for deposit insurance to remain viable in
the long run, the government must have ways of imposing restrictions on banks that limit their
ability to shift risk to the insurance agency and to taxpayers in general.  The best example of the
perverse dynamics of risk-shifting coupled with financial deepening  in the context of deposit
insurance comes from the example of the crisis  in the U.S.  savings and  loan industry in the
l980s, which is discussed in the box.21
The U.S.  S&L Crisis
As a result of high interest rates during the late  1970s and early  1980s, the net worth of many S&Ls  I
severely deteriorated.  The Fed originallv responded to the problem by imposing interest rate ceilings on
deposits, thereby taxing primarily small depositors to keep the S&Ls solvent.  When the creation of new
financial  instruments  caused  a  flight  of  funds  away  from  S&Ls,  Congress  responded  by  passing
legislation to help the thrift industry, primarily by deregulating asset powers of thrifts.
The new legislation permitted S&Ls to issue credit cards and to make consumer loans up to 30 percent of
assets, to make commercial real estate  loans up to 40 percent of assets, to make commercial  loans up to
11 percent of  assets, and  to  take  direct  equity  positions  up  to  3 percent  of assets.  State-chartering
authorities, especially  in Texas,  California, and Florida, provided even wider  asset powers to thrifts  in
what appears to have been regulatory competition to keep thrifts from adopting national charters.  During 
1983 and  1984 the resulting asset growth of S&Ls  (19 percent per year) far outstripped the asset growth
of commercial banks (7 percent per year).
White  (1991), drawing  on work by  Barth, Bartholomew, and Labich (1989), shows that heterogeneity
among thrifts played an important role in the credit boom.  The fastest growing thrifts (with asset growth I
exceeding  50%) placed far less reliance on residential mortages than  slow-growing thrifts (53% versus
68.1%), and far more reliance on commercial mortgages (10.8% versus 6.6%), land loans (5.8% versus
1.2%), nonmortgage loans (5.0% versus 3.7%), and direct equity investments in real estate (1.2% versus
0.2%).  Fast-growing thrifts placed far less reliance on retail deposits than slow-growing thrifts (59% of
liabilities versus 80.9%) and far more reliance on  large denomination brokered deposits (18.1% versus
7.3%) and short-term repurchase agreements (10.4% versus 2.4%).
Romer and Weingast (1990) argue that the fast growing thrifts were gambling for resurrection and were
able to do so because Congress forced the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) to
pursue a policy of forbearance that prevented the closure of undercapitalized S&Ls.  "By delaying FSLIC
recapitalization  and  by  keeping  recapitalization  to  low levels, Congress  ensured that  regulators  could
force  only  some  insolvent  S&Ls  to  close  or  reorganize....By  intervening  in  the  regulatory  process,
Congress prevented enforcement of existing rules and, through new legislation, relaxed many regulatory
provisions.  In sum, congressional action and inaction -- motivated largely by normal legislator strategies
of constituent service -- resulted in policies that created the debacle."
The deregulation of the thrifts produced financial  deepening  in the  S&L industry, but it also produce
excessive risk shifting to the government.  The government as a whole failed to enforce capital standards
and curtailed inspections of  S&Ls during 1984 and  1985.  Although the formal safety net (the funds of
the FSLIC)  was modest  in size, the  informal safety  net (the funds  of the U.S. Treasury)  was almost
unlimited in size.  Depositors did not worry about risk and, indeed, fast-growing thrifts only needed to
offer small premia on certificates of deposit to generate large deposit inflows.
The ex-post safety net to depositors involved shutting down over 700 intermnediaries  with assets of $400
billion. The Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), which  directly  or indirectly employed up  to 20,000
people during a three-year period, either liquidated the assets it acquired from failed thrifts or reorganized
existing  institutions.  The  cleanup  operations  of the  RTC  involved  realizing  a  loss to  taxpayers  of
approximately $200 billion.22
Deposit Insurance as a Form of Catastrophe Insitrance
Much discussion of safety nets is based on the premise that unobservable idiosyncratic
risk  poses  the  major  challenge  for  the  design  of  bank  capital,  supervision,  and  closure
mechanisms.  Financial intermediaries need to bear idiosyncratic risk for incentive purposes--
otherwise they would have no incentive to hold diversified portfolios.  Government safety nets
dampen that incentive, even when regulators attempt to impose risk-adjusted deposit insurance
premia.  Advocates of subordinated debt, such as Calomiris (1996), see it as a mechanism that
forces banks to worry about idiosyncratic risk.
Much of the risk faced by banks in Latin America and elsewhere, however, is aggregate
(systematic) risk rather than idiosyncratic (loan specific) risk.  Aggregate risk is observable by
all agents in an economy:  everyone knows when and by how much the price of copper or coffee
changes or by how much the London  interbank offer rate moves.  Aggregate risk need not be
borne by  intermediaries and,  indeed, being forced to  bear aggregate risk  may interfere with
intermediaries' incentives.  Enforcing penalty  loan rates on  firms,  a change of ownership on
banks, or liquidation of assets may be a  socially inefficient response to  a negative aggregate
shock.  Such actions penalize competent owners and  managers and may result in an inferior
utilization of an economy's assets.
One theoretical response to the issues raised by aggregate risk is to attempt to insulate
banks, either by letting them issue state contingent deposit contracts or by allowing them to buy
insurance against aggregate risk (Diamond 1984).  It is difficult in practice, however, to write
deposit contracts that are state contingent.  This is partly because of the difficulty of specifying
how the range of aggregate disturbances affect the value of a deposit, and partly because fixed
return deposits may be a characteristic of optimal bank structure (Gorton and Pennacchi 1990).
Having  banks  buy  insurance  supposes  that  there  is  an  international  reinsurance  market  for23
aggregate risk to banks.  The boxed discussion on catastrophe insurance indicates the difficulty
of insuring against aggregate risks of the sort faced by most Latin American economies.
A second response is to assume that banks bear aggregate risk in addition to idiosyncratic
risk,  and  to  examine  rules  for  government  recapitalization  of  banks  following  a  negative
aggregate shock.  This  approach runs into problems of  lack of government resources  for the
recapitalizations as well as moral hazard.  If banks know they will be recapitalized following a
negative aggregate shock, they have more of an incentive to lend to risky activities whose returns
are sensitive to aggregate fluctuations.  Given that incentive, the monitoring problem  for the
government involves a difficult intertemporal comparison of investment strategies of banks, as
elaborated in the boxed discussion on aggregate shocks, recapitalizations, and incentives.24
Catastrophe  Insurance  in the U.S. and Latin America
In the wake of the Northridge  earthquake in 1994 and Hurricane Andrew in the Miami area in 1995,
private catatastrophe  insurance  came close to drying up in the United  States. Companies  representing  93
percent of the homeowners'  market in California  either stopped writing  earthquake  insurance  policies or
severely  limited  their exposure  to liability. Similarly,  insurance  companies  operating  in Florida  increased
their hurricane  coverage  rates by 65 percent  following  Hurricane  Andrew.
For many  types of insurance,  such as life insurance  and auto insurance,  the law of large numbers allows
insurance  companies  to predict accurately  the level of claims.  Insurance  premia can be adjusted so that
there is little mismatch  between premia collected and claims paid out in any given year.  Catastrophe
insurance is a major exception to the rule.  Catastrophe insurance  claims require a large point-in-time
payout  after a catastrophe  occurs, but can be funded  only by collecting  premiums  over a long time period.
As a result  of the intertemporal  mismatch  between  claimspayouts  and premia collections,  catastrophes  in
the U.S. have become "uninsurable  risks."  According  to Jaffee and Russell (1996) "The contract of
catastrophe  insurance,  as presently  structured,  requires  that the seller have access  to a large pool of liquid
capital in every year in which the contract stands. Since such large pools of capital do not exist, firms
have withdrawn  forrm  this market rather than bear the risk of insolvency." Large pools of liquid capital
do not exist because tax incentives do not promote their accumulation  (reserve funds are considered
taxable)  and because  large cash reserves  attract hostile  takeovers,  among  other  reasons.
Insurance  firms have not been able to reinsure  against losses  from catastrophes  to any great extent, since
the international  reinsurance  catastrophe  capacity  is only $15 billion. Catastrophe  futures and options  are
only lightly traded on the Chicago Board of Trade.  One difficulty is the lack of any options pricing
formula, like the Black-Scholes, for catastrophe losses.  Catastrophe losses have a  sample path
characterized  by jumps which, unlike the paths of stocks for example,  are difficult  to fully hedge. Some
investment  banks issue  Act of God bonds for certain catastrophes  which pay interest  at 10 percent over
Treasury  rates, and which require holders to forgive  the loan in the event of the catastrophes. However,
the total amount  of catastrophe  reinsurance  offered  by capital  markes in the U.S. is quite small.
Some countries  self-insure  against "catastrophic"  declines in their terms of trade. Colombia,  for example,
has long made use of a coffee stabilization  fund while  Chile began a copper  stabilization  fund in the latter
half of the 1980s. These funds are pools of liquid resources that can potentially  serve to insure against
economic  catastrophes. However,  in the same  way that insurance  funds with large reserves  attract hostile
takeovers, large stabilization  funds invite the government  (and even the private sector)  to neutralize  the
funds by borrowing from international  investors who view the stabilization  fund as a guarantee of the
government's ability to  repay.  This problem is especially acute when several groups within the
government interact non-cooperatively  to generate  spending decisions.  Some economists even regard
such large  pools of contestable  funds as a "curse"  because  of the rent seeking  that accompanies  the pools.25
Aggregate Shocks, Recapitalizations, and Incentives
Figures  I and 2 show a two-period setting for a bank in which the expected second-period return to
depositors (D) is graphed on the vertical axis while the expected second-period return to loans (L) is
graphed  on  the  horizontal  axis.  The  expected  second-period  return  on  loans  depends  on  the
observable expected second-period state of nature (s).  The government requires the bank to invest in
reserves which have a second-period riskless payoff (R).
The payoff to depositors in Figure I is kinked at the point where loans equal deposits minus reserves
(L=D-R).  At this  point bank equity (E)  is zero, and for any  lower realizations of loan returns the
bank must default on the deposit  contracts, leaving depositors with claims worth  only the realized
loan payoffs.  Figure 2 graphs the payoff to equity holders.  Once again there  is a kink at the point
where returns on loans equal promised payments to depositors minus returns on reserves.  With lower
payoffs on loans the return on equity is zero.
The kinks define control rights over the bank:  to the left of the kink depositors (or the government
acting on behalf of depositors) control the bank, and to the right bank shareholders control the bank.
The bank's debt-equity structure gives depositors a concave stream of returns over different states of
nature  while  shareholders  have  a  convex  stream  of  returns.  The  concavity  and  convexity  are
especially pronounced near the kinks (where bank equity is zero), causing even risk-neutral deposit
holders to act risk averse (because bad realizations will cause them to forfeit returns and principal on
deposits)  and  stockholders  to  act  risk  loving (because  adding  risk  allows  them  to  gamble  for
resurrection).
For a bad expected state of nature Sb  the expected payoff on loans L(sb) creates a low equity value for
the bank, which is shown by the points just to the right of the kinks.  At these points the concavity of
returns to depositors induces conservative behavior to transfer control rights of the bank's assets to
depositors  (via mechanisms  such  as a  run on  the  bank),  even  if the  bank  is  still  solvent.  The
convexity of returns to stockholders induces them to find ways to add risk to the loan portfolio.  For
a good state of nature sg the expected payoff on loans L(sg) creates a high net worth for the bank,
placing  depositors and shareholders well to the right of the kinks.  Returns are more nearly linear for
depositors and shareholders, reducing incentives for excessive conservative or risk-loving behavior.
Because the expected state of nature is an aggregate, observable risk, banks should not be forced to
bear that risk.  If the expected state of nature is the bad one Sb, there  is no good reason to penalize
bank  shareholders  (and  managers)  by  liquidating  the  bank's  assets.  As  an  alternative,  the
government could recapitalize  the  bank by an amount  G, thereby  shifting the  funds available  for
loans to the right (L(sb)+G), where depositors and bankers have the appropriate incentives to run the
bank well.26
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The major difficulty with recapitalization schemes is the moral hazard problem:  bankers
who  understand the incentives to recapitalize have an incentive to create  loan portfolios
whose returns are highly correlated with aggregate disturbances to the economy.  Such
strategies maximize returns to bankers while assuring that the owners will retain control
of  the  bank  in  bad  times.  Dewatripont  and  Tirole  (1993)  have  suggested  that
recapitalization  decisions  be based  on  an  ex ante assessment  of the  performance  and
riskiness of banks, but they acknowledge the difficulties of implementing such a proposal.
Chile's use of subordinated  Central Bank date in 1982 and  1983 to rescue banks imposed
an ex-post penalty on those banks whose performance prevented them from repurchasing
the debt, since extinguishing the debt carried with it the privilege of expanding into new
and  lucrative areas of banking in the economy.  If continued as policy into the  future,
Chile's  recapitalization  mechanism  removes  much  of  the  moral  hazard  problem  of
recapitalizing  banks  following  aggregate  shocks,  although  it  requires  institutional
discipline  over  many  years of debt  repurchasing  (e.g.,  1982-1996)  if  it is to  operate
successfully.27
6. The Design of Safety Nets
In this paper I have stressed three principles that should guide the design and ongoing
operations of a  safety net.  First,  safety nets  should strengthen rather  than supplant private
capital, monitoring,  and closure mechanisms.  I have shown that the presence of asymmetric
information provides borrowers, bankers, and depositors with incentives to voluntarily impose
capital  requirements,  monitoring  arrangements,  and  contractual  provisions  for  closure  or
recapitalization of firms and banks.  Government regulations or safety net provisions should be
designed to work in harmony with the incentives already faced by private agents. Second, safety
nets must take into account both aggregate risk and idiosyncratic risk.  In particular, good safety
nets must be designed that take into account large but infrequent macroeconomic shocks as well
as to encourage prudential bank behavior during normal times.  Third, safety net design should
be grounded in the historical and institutionalframework  of  any given country.  Much work in
institutional economics  has emphasized that institutions such as safety nets evolve over time.
The paper has referred to various  innovations in Latin America's financial history--nineteenth
century mortgage banks, 1  920s central banks, 1  970s financial liberalizations, and the more recent
adoption  of  deposit  insurance--to  make  it easier  to  appreciate  that  today's  safety  net  faces
problems  that  are  common  to  those  of  a  century  ago.  The  design  of  safety  nets  today,
nevertheless, must take into account the current set of political pressures and generally higher
expectations regarding  the  ability  of the  government  to  insure  the  financial  system  against
aggregate shocks.  Following these three principles will produce differences across countries in
the  specific institutions  and rules that  make up the safety net, but  similarities  in the overall
objective of financial deepening and the control of risk shifting to the government.28
Prudential Regulation that Lowers the Cost of Macroeconomic Shocks
The discussion on catastrophe insurance in Section 5 emphasized that governments in
viturally  all  countries  are  the  providers  of  such  insurance,  rather  than  private  insurance
companies.  For example, when hurricanes hit populated oceanfront areas, governments come to
the  aid  of  homeowners  whose  homes  are  damaged  or  destroyed.  Nevertheless,  if  the
homeonvers  build close  to  the  ocean knowing  that  the  government  will  provide  insurance
against such a catastrophe, then the size of the government's outlay grows due to moral hazard.
The moral hazard associated with the government's policy calls for the government to create an
agency to implement tough rules that prevent homebuilders from building too close to the ocean
or building with too flimsy construction materials.
Governments should similarly provide a safety net to the financial system in the event of
a "catastrophic" shock to the economy.  But the size of the bailout associated with the safety net
will be affected by the government's  ability to  control moral hazard  in the years prior  to the
shock.  It is in the good years prior to a  shock (like the calm years  with no hurricanes) that
government agencies  should  be  given the  incentives to  strictly enforce  conservative  capital,
monitoring, and closure policies.  The following discussion gives some indication of the relevant
issues.
Closure Policy.  Closure policy is the Achilles' Heel of any explicit or implicit government safety
net to the financial system.  The inability to close failing banks permits bank equity holders to
engage in the rollover of loan losses and other risky lending practices, thereby bidding deposits
away  from  other institutions  and  transmitting  incentives for risky, lending  to the  rest  of the
financial system.  Just a few banks operating in this  way during good times can weaken the
whole system's ability to withstand a large aggregate shock.
Both technical and political reasons explain why closure policy is such a thorny issue for
bank regulation. From a technical standpoint, bank liquidation is generally only undertaken as a
last resort to avoid the loss of the ongoing operation value of the bank.  In between forbearance29
and  liquidation  are a  wide  range of possibilities,  including  voluntary recapitalization by  the
bank's  owners,  cash-assisted  acquisition  by  another  bank,  temporary  administration  by  a
government  work-out  agency,  and  forced  capital  levies  on  depositors.  Knowing  which
intervention to choose and creating the human capital to implement the intervention are difficult
technical problems.
From a  political  standpoint,  allowing a  bank to  fail will not  only  incur the  wrath of
noninsured lenders to the bank but will also go against the interest of politicians who depend on
bank owners for political support. The problem for designers of bank safety nets is to create ex
ante agreements that make it difficult ex post to renege on the "no bailout" position.  Because the
impending failure of a large bank  may disrupt  the payments  system, the  various intervention
options must be spelled out in some detail in advance in order to facilitate the bank resolution
process without resort to a political rescue of the bank's owners.  About one fourth of the 1986
Chilean bank law, for example, is devoted to the precise specification of alternative closure and
recapitalization mechanisms for banks in Chile.
A more subtle political problem involves inter-agency cooperation in bank interventions
and  closures.  The  superintendency  of  banks  has  responsibility  f6r  determining  whether
intervention is called for, the deposit insurance agency must be willing to provide the necessary
funds to resolve the insurance problem, and the central bank must provide the liquidity while the
intervention is resolved.  Lack of cooperation by any one of these agencies can derail the closure
or recapitalization process.  Under-funding of the deposit insurance agency, for example, may
cause that agency to push for the delay of a bank intervention that would deplete the agency's
funds.  One possible solution is to create a truly independent central bank that would have the
incentive to be tough on banks and the deposit insurance agency in order to guard its capital. This
also implies, of course, that the central bank may be unwilling to provide emergency liquidity if
it cannot be assured of eventual recovery of those funds.
Monitoring.  Compounding  the  technical  problems  associated  with  bank  closure are
additional technical  problems stemming from  difficulties in  monitoring the true net worth of30
banks.  For example, regulators must decide when loans that are current should be classified as of
doubtful recovery.  When the collateral value of the real estate securing a $30 million mortgage
falls from $35 million to $25 million, the loan may stay current for a while, but eventual default
is almost inevitable.  Regulatory  enforcement is especially difficult when the fall in collateral
values  is perceived to be  the result of  an external shock rather than due  to reckless lending
practices.  Given that there can be disagreement over market values during a collapse in the real
estate market, even market value accounting permits long delays in recognizing losses.  A two-
year  delay  in  forcing  the  recognition  of  losses  while  the  real  estate  market  is  adjusting
downward, for example, will create the incentives and provide sufficient time for even "good"
bankers to gamble away a bank's future by taking on excessive risk.
Capital.  In  general  it  appears  that  risk-adjusted  capital  requirements  can  play  an
important role in the design  of a  financial safety net, provided  that  there are adequate bank
closure policies and monitoring of banks.  Without good monitoring, banks have the incentive to
engage in double gearing to artificially raise book value capital.  The main bank in an economic
group may, for example, make a loan to a company in the group on the understanding that the
company  use  the  funds to  purchase  equity  in  the  bank.  This  action  increases  the  bank's
regulatory capital without increasing the economic group's real capital.
Without  good  monitoring  and  closure  policies,  banks  also  have  the  incentive  to
underreport and underprovision bad loans.  Adequate provisioning is crucial for the long-term
viability  of  risk-adjusted  capital  requirements.  Underprovisioning  keeps  the  return to  bank
equity artificially high, so that the cumulative excess flow of dividends destroys market value
capital in a process that resembles  "looting" of the bank.  Looting of this sort is easy when an
increase in the value of implicit or explicit deposit guarantees automatically offsets the decline in
the value of the bank's capital.
A number of writers, including Benston and colleagues (1986) and Calomiris (1996) have
advocated the use of subordinated debt requirements.  Subordinated debt can complement risk-
adjusted capital requirements by creating additional pressures to adequately provision bad loans.31
When to Overrule Prudential Regulators
Different  institutional  arrangements  for  prudential  regulation  do  tolerably  well  in
preventing risk shifting to the government during nornal  times.  The big problems arise in the
aftermath of a negative aggregate shock when borrowers' debt becomes impossible to service and
banks' capital and reserves become inadequate to cover probable losses.  In all these cases it is
unlikely that subordinated debt will prevent the incentives for risk taking that follow the shock,
since subordinated debt holders may have been wiped out along with the shareholders.  Many of
the examples in this paper have focused on ex post financial safety nets that have emerged in the
wake of negative aggregate shocks.  The collapse of Chilean export markets in 1859, the Great
Depression, and the 1982-83 recession all created pressures for a safety net to save the banks and
bank borrowers.  Similarly, the safety net for U.S. S&Ls was created following the aggregate
shock of a rise in interest rates that compromised the capital of most S&Ls.
At some point for virtually any country in Latin America, a well-designed safety net--
meaning one that controls risk shifting to the government and simultaneously promotes financial
deepening--will be overwhelmed by a negative macroeconomic shock.  Imposing penalty interest
rates and shutting down banks, which is the correct course of action given the.  incentives of bank
regulators, will in fact be counterproductive.  Chile's decision in the early 1930s to stand by the
gold standard and to enforce prudential bank regulation eventually resulted in a military coup and
the  adoption of  a  series of  ad  hoc  economic policies that  later  formed the basis  for import
substitution in that country.
Regulators should be given "hard control rights" in order to control risk-taking behavior
that could cause an expensive bailout when a shock occurs.  But having controlled the risk-taking
behavior, the broader government has an incentive to assume the remaining macroeconomic risk
borne  by  banks.  As  discussed  in  the box  on  catastrophe insurance,  one way  to  insure the
macroeconomic risk is for the government to self-insure by accumulating a large fund of liquid32
resources.  Another way is to secure lines of credit internationally, as Argentina has done, that
can be used in the event of a macroeconomic shock.  A third way is to rescue the banks using
government debt, but to require repayment (over many years if necessary) if a bank wishes to
expand into new areas of operations.  This was the Chilean solution in the 1  980s and 1  990s.
There is a cost in establishing prudential regulation and safety net institutions that are
immune to political pressures.  Although these regulations and institutions minimize the cost of
moral hazard in good years, they may prove too rigid when a macroeconomic shock hits.  If no
one in the government can overrule the central bank, and the central bank is intent on enforcing
prudential regulations and on guarding its capital, then it may take a revolution to put a more
extensive safety net in place.  Conservative prudential regulation and enforcing agencies should
therefore be insulated from political pressure, but not so much that true economic "catastrophes"
are made worse by actions taken by the agencies.
Since economic catastrophes such as the Great Depression and the  1980s depression in
Latin America are rare events, one may question whether it is worth preparing for times when
prudential standards are lifted.  Perhaps it is enough to put  strong prudential regulations and
safety  nets  into place  that  control  moral hazard  during  normal  times.  However,  the costs
associated  with  not  knowing  when  to  relax  prudential  standards  and  not  knowing  how to
implement  rescue packages  are  quite  large. 8 Since  bank  and  debtor  rescue packages,  like
catastrophe  insurance,  require  access  to  international  capital  markets,  it  makes  sense  for
governments to plan for the future.  At present, unfortunately, there are few studies of the actual
transitions that governments have made going from enforcing standard prudential regulation to
adopting the ex-post safety nets generally associated with the arrival of large macroeconomic
shocks.
8See Caprio  and Klingebiel  (1996).References
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